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INTRODUCTION
This symposium addresses barriers to Title VII claims. Until recently,
scholars and litigants could only wonder whether Supreme Court decisions
limiting discrimination law were driven by inherent judicial skepticism about
the plaintiffs claims. If this skepticism existed, it remained important to the
underlying doctrine, but hidden from view.I
The Supreme Court's decision in University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar represents a watershed moment in employment
t Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. We would like to thank Michael
Solimine, Joseph Seiner, and Jennifer Robbennolt for providing comments on early drafts of
this article.
1 Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. See generally Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 ILL.
L. REV. 145 (2011) (arguing that some doctrinal changes can best be understood as a shift in
underlying factual premises). Although not its main focus, this Article contributes to
Professor Sherry's account of foundational facts. Professor Sherry describes these facts as
invisible intuitions. Id. at 146. This Article discusses how the Supreme Court explicitly
articulates its beliefs about fakers and floodgates, thus bringing foundational facts into view.
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discrimination litigation.2 The majority opinion posited that an employee might
try to avoid termination by filing a fake retaliation claim against his employer.
It also expressed fears about courts, administrative agencies, and employers
being subjected to floodgates of litigation.4 It then explicitly used these
concerns about fakers and floodgates to tip substantive discrimination law in an
employer-friendly direction.
Nassar expresses three ideas about employees and their claims. First, the
sheer volume of cases is enough to favor a more onerous causal standard.5
Second, enough employees will bring false claims that substantive retaliation
doctrine needs to protect courts, administrative agencies, and employers from
6fakers. Third, existing procedural mechanisms are not adequate to ferret out
these false claims.7 Rather, they must be dealt with by altering the substantive
law.
This Article responds to the alleged fakers and floodgates problem. First, it
argues that the Court has created reasons to alter the law that are not grounded
in congressional intent. Title VII contains numerous provisions that limit the
reach of the statute. Beyond these restrictions, Congress never expressed any
intention to limit the number of claims heard by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the courts based on concerns about the
sheer volume of such claims. Nor did Congress express any intent that the
courts use the substantive law to screen for false retaliation cases. Through
various provisions in Title VII, Congress established a statute designed to
protect employers, employees, and courts. Multiple provisions establish a
mechanism to ensure that employees are able to bring claims, that employers
can adequately defend against claims, and that courts do not hear claims that
can be resolved by the EEOC.9 Moreover, Title VII was enacted in the presence
of several existing devices that can be employed to stem any false claims and
any related floodgates of litigation. These devices allow judges to sanction
parties who file false claims and to dismiss these cases. While the Supreme
Court considers these devices to be adequate to handle the misbehavior of
employers, in Nassar the Court rejected the possibility that procedural
mechanisms are sufficient to deal with false claims filed by employees.
Second, although we argue that the Court's fakers and floodgates
arguments are improper, they are also problematic because they are not
supported by empirical or other evidence. To the contrary, available evidence
2. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
3. Id. at 2531-32.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 2531.
6. See id. at 2531-32.
7. See id. at 2532.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part Il.
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shows that the number of employment-related civil rights claims is decreasing
both in raw numbers and in proportion to the number of civil claims filed in
federal court." This Article questions whether the judiciary generally, and the
Supreme Court in particular, is the best institution to make factual claims about
fakers and floodgates.
Third, this Article also challenges the accuracy of the Court's assertion that
changing the substantive law will reduce the number of spurious claims. At
best, such a change is a blunt instrument for handling frivolous claims. Most
importantly, changing the law represents a choice about what counts as legal
retaliation and what does not. By requiring plaintiffs to establish but for cause,
the Supreme Court has declared that an employer does not retaliate against an
employee (in a legal sense) if the causal connection is less strong. In other
words, if an employee can show only that retaliatory motive was a motivating
factor in her termination, she has not suffered retaliation under Title VII.
Fourth, we discuss the dangers of the floodgates and fakers arguments
becoming explicitly embedded in judicial doctrine. Such a default position
distracts from the larger congressional goal of preventing retaliation and
confuses the underlying legal doctrine. Thus far, two courts have already cited
the Court's concerns in their opinions.12 This Article calls for the EEOC and
other organizations concerned with employment discrimination to develop a
factual response to arguments about fakers and floodgates before these myths
develop into an uncontestable judicial narrative that courts can use to justify
other changes in the law.
Finally, we argue that the fakers and floodgates arguments are consistent
with a broader problem-courts' infusion of their own views of evidence of
discrimination into procedure and substance. Courts use these devices to
prevent juries from hearing factually intensive civil rights cases, even when a
plaintiff presents evidence of a colorable claim.
Part I explores the Nassar decision, specifically focusing on the portion of
the opinion where the Supreme Court makes arguments about the number of
retaliation claims and about spurious claims. Part II discusses congressional
intent related to retaliation law and shows that Congress did not intend to use
the substantive law to reduce the number of claims beyond limits already
contained in the statute. Part III uses empirical and other evidence to factually
challenge the Court's intuitions about fakers and floodgates. Part IV explores
broader problems with explicitly imbedding the fakers and floodgates tropes
into substantive law. Finally, in Part V, we show how this recent explicit turn
by the Court to fakers and floodgates is consistent with a broader pattern of the
I1. See infra Part III.A.
12. Childs-Bey v. Mayor of Bait., No. TJS-10-2835, 2013 WL 5718747, at *2 (D. Md.
Oct. 17, 2013); Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, No. TJS-10-1933, 2013 WL 5487813, at *2
(D. Md. Sept. 27, 2013); see also Chase v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 12-11182-DPW, 2013 WL
5948373, at *11 (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 2013) (citing concerns in FMLA context).
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courts using their own views of evidence of discrimination to take civil rights
cases away from juries.
I. BACKGROUND
Title VII is a federal statute that prohibits an employer from taking certain
actions based on an employee's race, color, national origin, sex, or religion.' 3
In Title VII, Congress explicitly acknowledged that some employers
discriminate against employees based on these protected traits and that a
litigation remedy should exist for such improper conduct.14 Congress also
specifically provided protection against retaliation for employees who complain
about discrimination and later face an adverse action.15
In Nassar, the Supreme Court determined the causal standard that a
plaintiff is required to establish in Title VII retaliation cases.16 Nassar required
the Court to make a choice between three possible interpretations of Title VII,
each reflecting a different choice about Title VII's text, Court precedent, and
the effects of the 1991 amendments to Title VII's retaliation provisions. 7 The
Court held that plaintiffs in Title VII retaliation cases were required to establish
"but for" cause.1 This choice favors employers because it requires the plaintiff
to bear the burden of persuasion related to causation and makes that causal
burden a "but for" standard, rather than the less onerous "motivating factor"
standard. Indeed, in an earlier Title VII case, the Court noted that to require the
plaintiff to establish "but for" cause would mean that many plaintiffs would be
unable to prevail, even though their protected traits played a role in an
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2011). Fakers and floodgates claims also potentially affect
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2012), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2011).
This Article focuses primarily on Title VII.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
16. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2522-23 (2013).
17. In 1989, the Court interpreted Title VII to require a plaintiff to establish that a
protected trait was a substantial factor or motivating part in a decision. Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41, 250 (1989) (plurality); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring)
(using a substantial factor analysis); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (using a substantial
factor analysis). The Court held that an employer could avoid liability by establishing that it
would have made the same decision absent consideration of the protected trait. Id. at 258
(plurality); id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
1991, Congress amended Title VII by codifying the motivating factor standard, but altering
an employer's affirmative defense to liability. If the employer established the same decision
defense, it would not escape liability, but would face a limited scope of damages. Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 185 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In 2009, the Court
held that plaintiffs alleging age discrimination must establish "but for" cause. Id. at 180
(majority opinion).
18. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2528.
FAKERS AND FLOODGATES
employment outcome.' 9
The Court bolstered its statutory construction with a section of the opinion
dedicated to administrability concerns. The Court noted that causation
standards "have central importance to the fair and responsible allocation of
resources in the judicial and litigation systems."20 It recited that the number of
retaliation claims filed with the EEOC had doubled from 16,000 in 1997 to
31,000 in 2012.21
Next, the Court stated that it chose the more employer-friendly causation
standard because to do otherwise would be to "contribute to the filing of
frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by employer[s],
administrative agencies, and courts to combat workplace harassment." 22
Employees who become aware of a pending negative employment action may
be tempted to raise unfounded discrimination claims to create a false retaliation
claim.23 The Court provided an example of the kind of person who would be
able to take advantage of a lower causal standard. Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy hypothesized:
Consider in this regard the case of an employee who knows that he or she is
about to be fired for poor performance, given a lower pay grade, or even just
transferred to a different assignment or location. To forestall that lawful
action, he or she might be tempted to make an unfounded charge of racial,
sexual, or religious discrimination; then, when the unrelated employment
action comes, the employee could allege that it is retaliation. If respondent
were to prevail in his argument here, that claim could be established by a
lessened causation standard, all in order to prevent the undesired change in
employment circumstances. Even if the employer could escape judgment after
trial, the lessened causation standard would make it far more difficult to
dismiss dubious claims at the summary judgment stage. Cf. Vance v. Ball
State Univ., post, at 9-11. It would be inconsistent with the structure and
operation of Title VII to so raise the costs, both financial and reputational, on
an employer whose actions were not in fact the result of any discriminatory or
retaliatory intent. See Brief for National School Boards Association as Amicus
Curiae 11-22. Yet there would be a sinificant risk of that consequence if
respondent's position were adopted here.
The Court gave one final reason for the establishment of a more difficult
causation standard. The summary judgment mechanism would not adequately
ferret out these claims, even though employers could escape judgment after
19. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (plurality); see also David Sherwyn,
Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Experimental Evidence that Retaliation Claims are Unlike
Other Employment Discrimination Claims, 44 SETON HALL L. REv. 455, 486-500 (2014)
(discussing mock juror responses to different causal standards).
20. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2531.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2531-32.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2532.
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trial.25
These passages convey three ideas. First, the volume of retaliation claims
justifies a shift in the substantive law. Second, enough people would file fake
retaliation claims if the Court adopted a motivating factor causal standard that
the substantive law must respond to protect the resources of employers,
administrative agencies, and courts. Third, existing sanctions and other
mechanisms are inadequate to address the stated problems and the substantive
change does address them.
Nassar is striking because the choice it makes will hamper legitimate
claims by plaintiffs. A simplified example of an employment decision
illustrates the problem. Sally's supervisor is Bob. Sally complains to the human
resources department that Bob is sexually harassing her. Bob gets angry and
starts micromanaging Sally's work. Bob tells his supervisor Larry that Sally is
a problem employee and that she is making mistakes. Larry, who is not aware
of the sexual harassment allegation, begins to think of Sally as a problem
employee. Bob reports to Larry that Sally is fifteen minutes late for work two
days in a row. Although Larry would normally overlook such an infraction, he
decides to fire Sally. Before he does, he asks Bob whether Sally should be
fired. Bob also recommends that Sally be fired.
While it is clear that the sexual harassment complaint played a role in
Sally's termination, it is unclear whether Sally could establish "but for" cause.
This difficulty occurs, at least in part, because the "but for" construct does not
work well for internal states of mind and in situations involving multiple
decision makers. By choosing the "but for" standard to address fakers and
floodgates concerns, the Court chose a blunt instrument. The substantive law
may limit or deter fakers, but it will also limit and deter legitimate claims. The
more important question, which the Court did not address, is whether courts
should recognize a retaliation claim in such circumstances to bolster the
effectiveness of the statute's anti-discrimination protections and to encourage
plaintiffs to raise claims.
Importantly, altering the substantive standard changes what the courts
count as constituting retaliation. If an employer takes an adverse action in part
because of a retaliatory motive, that action will not count as legal retaliation
unless the aggrieved person can prove the retaliatory motive was a "but for"
cause of the adverse action. According to the Court, if retaliatory motive only
plays a motivating factor in a decision, it is not enough for the law to recognize
the result as retaliation. 26
It could be argued that the Court's discussion of fakers and floodgates is
simply dicta. Support for this argument is found in the Court's summary, which
does not include a reference to fakers and floodgates but rather a discussion of
25. Id.
26. See id. at 2533.
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only statutory construction.27 However, the dissent itself recognized the Court's
"zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims filed against employers"
apparently drove the Court's holding in favor of the more onerous causation
28
standard. In any event, even if dicta, the fakers and floodgates arguments
suggest the influence of improper motivations over the Court's holding. Lower
courts already have cited these passages from Nassar.29
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
In Nassar, the majority makes three separate claims. First, it asserts that it
can consider the volume of litigation to decide the merits of the underlying
statutory dispute. 30 Second, it states that the volume of false claims affects the
resources of courts, administrative agencies, and employers and justifies
choosing one causal, substantive standard over another. ' Third, it argues that
existing sanction and procedural mechanisms are not adequate to handle these
concerns and a more onerous causal standard will be. 32
The Court's claim about the sheer volume of litigation is problematic
because it ignores congressional intent. Congress created the Title VII
retaliation provisions to protect people who complain about discrimination and
explicitly provided a private right of action for retaliation victims. 33 So,
Congress has directed the courts to hear and resolve such claims. No
congressional authority in Title VII or otherwise permits the Court to shift the
substantive law to decrease the workload of the federal courts. 34
Congress inserted numerous procedural and substantive provisions in Title
VII that limit the number of claims, and there is no indication that it intended to
allow the courts to further limit the volume of claims. Before filing suit in
court, plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or state
agency within a specified time and then must file the lawsuit within a specified
time period. If a plaintiff does not file the charge or lawsuit within the
27. Id. at 2532-33.
28. Id. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
29. E.g., Childs-Bey v. Mayor of Balt., No. TJS-10-2835, 2013 WL 5718747, at *2 (D.
Md. Oct. 17, 2013); Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, No. TJS-10-1933, 2013 WL 5487813,
at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2013); see also Chase v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 12-11182-DPW,
2013 WL 5948373, at *11 (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 2013) (citing concerns in FMLA context).
30. See Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2531.
31. Id at 2531-32.
32. See id. at 2532.
33. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2011).
34. Further, the Supreme Court does not typically rely on floodgates arguments when
Congress explicitly provides for a private right of action and the issue is whether to allow
claims under that explicit right of action. See generally Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of
Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007 (2013) (discussing how courts use floodgates arguments
in various contexts).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1). The requirements under the ADEA vary slightly
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required period, the claim is usually barred.36 These time periods are short.
Plaintiffs must file a charge within 180 or 300 days from the discriminatory act
and must file their claim in court within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue
letter.37 Moreover, after hearing from the employee and the employer, the
EEOC or the state agency may mediate the claim and/or find that there is no
reasonable cause for the claim. 38
Congress has permitted only certain claims to proceed. For example, if the
charge filing requirements are not met, the claims generally cannot proceed.39
Also, plaintiffs may only bring claims against employers who employ at least
fifteen employees.40 The person bringing the claim must be an individual that
falls within the statutory protections, such as an employee or former
employee.4' Often volunteers, independent contractors, and other similarly
situated people are not protected by Title VII, even if they are subjected to
discrimination.42
Title VII explicitly provides numerous defenses and affirmative defenses to
employer liability. Under the bona fide occupation qualification (BFOQ)
provision, the employer may make employment decisions based on a person's
protected class in limited instances.43 Title VII protects certain seniority
systems from statutory reach, even though they arguably perpetuate past
discrimination.4 An employer may prevail on a disparate impact claim if its
job criteria are job-related and consistent with business necessity.45
Congress also limited the relief available under Title VII. Title VII caps the
total combined compensatory and punitive damages a plaintiff may recover
46dependent upon the number of employees employed by the defendant. The
highest cap, which applies to employers with more than 500 employees, is
but still require the filing of a charge. See, e.g., Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, No.
1:10CV24-A-D, 2010 WL 5232523, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) (discussing how Title
VII requires plaintiffs to receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC while ADEA does not
contain this requirement).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l), (f)(1).
38. Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2014) (describing various ways
to resolve a charge).
39. See, e.g., Houston v. Saint John's Mercy Skilled Nursing Ctr., No. 94-2141, 1994
WL 567475, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 18, 1994).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
42. E.g., Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that independent contractors are not protected by Title VII); Smith v. Berks Cmty.
Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that volunteers are not protected
by Title VII).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
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$300,000.47 The statute also explicitly defines the type of compensatory
damages available under it.48
Although the Nassar majority purports to be following congressional intent
in other portions of the opinion, the Court does not consider congressional
intent related to its floodgates or fakers claims. This omission is problematic in
its own right, but also points to a larger problem with how the Court engages in
statutory interpretation. In Nassar, the Court considered congressional intent to
be evidenced in the choice of the words "because of' and Congress's failure to
explicitly amend Title VII's retaliation causal standard in 1991.49 The Court
completely ignores how Title VII's text, when taken as a whole, balances
employee, employer, agency, and court interests in ways that express intent
related to administrability.
Nassar's second and third assertions are that the courts must use
substantive law to reduce spurious claims because available procedural and
substantive mechanisms are inadequate.50  However, Congress already
addressed these concerns within Title VII. As discussed in prior paragraphs,
Congress set forth several mechanisms in Title VII to ensure that only a limited
number of claims would proceed through the courts and plaintiffs who
prevailed would receive only certain relief. Moreover, Congress enacted Title
VII against a backdrop of available mechanisms giving courts the power to
dismiss claims with no evidence of discrimination and sanction parties who
brought such claims.
Facets of the administrative process and the statutory language address
frivolity concerns. The charge of discrimination is notarized under penalty of
perjury.5 1 Title VII's fee-shifting provisions can be used to punish a plaintiff
for bringing a frivolous claim.52 A court can award an employer attorneys' fees
and costs if it finds that the plaintiffs claim was frivolous, unreasonable or
groundless, and the defendant is not required to establish the plaintiffs
subjective bad faith to obtain these fees and costs.53
Congress enacted Title VII against a backdrop of existing mechanisms for
judicial case management. Federal judges possess a wide range of tools to
dismiss false claims and to sanction parties who raise them. Before discussing
these mechanisms, a caveat is necessary. We do not advocate that courts
broadly use procedural mechanisms and sanctions to dismiss employment
discrimination claims. Rather, we discuss tools that courts have to respond to
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3).
49. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2527-31 (2013).
50. Id at 2532.
51. Charge of Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foialforms/upload/form_5.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
53. EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc., 667 F.3d 510, 517 (4th Cir. 2012).
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plaintiffs who bring false or meritless claims in court.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a number of sanction
mechanisms. Under Rule 11, a party's or attorney's signature on a document
represents that the document is not being presented for improper purposes and
that the claims are warranted by existing law or non-frivolous arguments to
change the law, and that factual contentions have evidentiary support.54
Available penalties include payment of attorneys' fees or other expenses to the
opposing party related to the violation. 5 Those signing discovery responses
and requests make similar representations, with sanctions available for
violating these representations.56 Sanctions are also available under Rule 37 for
discovery violations, which would likely occur if the plaintiff fabricated her
claim. 57 Similarly, attorneys may be sanctioned pursuant to a federal statute,
and federal judges may hold parties or attorneys in contempt of court.58
Moreover, attorneys who file false claims may be referred to bar authorities
for sanctions, and federal courts may revoke the ability of an attorney to appear
before the court. Outside of specific sanction mechanisms, the courts possess
59inherent authority to manage cases and issue sanctions.
Although other procedural devices are not specifically directed toward
false claims, they can be used to resolve claims that lack merit. Early in a case,
a defendant can seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiffs complaint
does not provide facts to establish a plausible claim.60 A defendant may seek
summary judgment under Rule 56 prior to trial,6 ' judgment as a matter of law
62
under Rule 50(a) during trial, and renewed judgment as a matter of law after
trial under Rule 50(b).63 Moreover, if the case reaches a jury, the jury is not
required to believe evidence offered by the plaintiff and can make credibility
determinations at trial. Together, this is a powerful set of devices to limit false
claims of which Congress was aware when it enacted and amended Title VII.
Indeed, in an analogous context, a line of Supreme Court cases has asserted
that these mechanisms are strong enough to curb employer misconduct in
employment discrimination cases. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c)(4).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1), (3).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012).
59. See Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("As old as
the judiciary itself, the inherent power enables courts to protect their institutional integrity
and to guard against abuses of the judicial process with contempt citations, fines, awards of
attorneys' fees, and such other orders and sanctions as they find necessary, including even
dismissals and default judgments.").
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
61. FED.R.Civ.P.56.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
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Court was faced with a case in which the district court judge determined that
the employer had not provided the real reasons for its decisions to demote and
dismiss the plaintiff.64 The trial court analyzed the case under the three-part,
65burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas test. Under this test, a plaintiff could
establish a rebuttable presumption of discrimination by proving the elements of
a prima facie case.66 The test then required the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.67 The district court found
that the employer articulated a false reason for the employee's demotion and
68dismissal. In determining how this should affect the discrimination analysis,
the Supreme Court allowed the employer to meet its burden of production in
the McDonnell Douglas test by articulating a reason for acting that was not the
true reason. Stated another way, a defendant can meet its obligations under
the second step of the McDonnell Douglas test even if it lies about why it took
an employment action.
The Court believed that fact-finders were capable of determining whether
the employer's false reason for its conduct was a cover for unlawful
discrimination.70 In the case, the Court recognized that civil and criminal
penalties exist for perjury. 71 The Court set forth reasons that employers might
present evidence that does not represent the real reason for their actions.72 It
stated that discrimination cases often involve complex determinations about
actors' state of mind and that the employer must often rely on information
provided to it by low-level employees. 73 The Court indicated that it was absurd
to paint all employers who presented unpersuasive testimony as liars or
*74perjurers.
The Court's belief that courts can handle analogous employer misconduct
through typical procedural devices is also illustrated in the after-acquired
evidence context. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., the Court
created an equitable defense to damages called the after-acquired evidence
defense. If the employer is able to prove that the employee engaged in
wrongdoing that would have resulted in her termination, the employer can limit
64. 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993).
65. Id. at 506.
66. Id at 506-07.
67. Id
68. Id. at 508.
69. Id. at 510-11.
70. Cf id. at 521-22 (explaining that devices other than Title V1I exist to deter
employers' false statements and that plaintiffs should not be expected to refute reasons for
termination not articulated by employers).
71. Id. at 521.
72. Id at 520-22.
73. Id. at 520.
74. Id. at 521.
75. 513 U.S. 352, 362-63 (1995).
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its damages even if the employee establishes the employer discriminated
against her.76 The Court indicated the "not . . . insubstantial" concern that
employers might inappropriately undertake extensive discovery into an
employee's background or performance to find after-acquired evidence.77
However, the Court was certain that attorneys' fees provisions and the Federal
78Rules of Civil Procedure were adequate to meet these concerns.
When the Nassar Court used the volume of claims and the possibility of
frivolous claims to shift statutory interpretation, it failed to explicitly consider
or even balance how Title VII's language reflects congressional intent
regarding these issues. Nor did it consider that Congress created and amended
Title VII against a backdrop of robust judicial mechanisms for controlling
spurious claims.
III. UNSUPPORTED ARGUMENTS ABOUT FALSE CLAIMS AND FLOODGATES
Nassar makes factual arguments related to how the number of retaliation
claims will affect the resources of three entities: employers, administrative
agencies, and courts. 79 As described above, Congress has established a cause of
action for employment discrimination and provided numerous mechanisms
within Title VII to limit claims. Also as described, it was aware of other
mechanisms outside of Title VII to assess claims and punish false claims. In
other words, through these mechanisms Congress chose to give the courts
certain mechanisms to ferret out claims but did not give them the authority to
otherwise assess whether there were too many claims of discrimination.
Assuming the Court has any authority to speak on this topic, this Part discusses
how the Court is not competent to make this argument.
It is important to remember that the only empirical evidence that the Court
relied upon was the number of charges of retaliation filed with the EEOC over
time.80 The Court did not rely on a factual record provided by the parties, the
government, or amici. Although the argument made by the Court is similar in
some ways to other arguments about floodgates, these floodgates arguments are
particularly egregious here because the Court is attempting to use such
arguments to shift the substantive law for a claim explicitly provided for by the
statutory scheme and also to trump the interpretation of the law advocated by
the executive branch.8'
76. Id.
77. Id at 363.
78. Id. It is possible that a plaintiff with a spurious claim could slip through all of these
mechanisms. But this is not the correct concern or the concern raised by the Supreme Court.
The question is whether there are enough of these individuals to warrant tipping substantive
law in favor of the employer and against some retaliation victims.
79. Univ. ofTex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013).
80. Id.
81. See also Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae
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As a practical matter, it is difficult to understand how the Supreme Court
Justices could possess any accurate insight into the number of false retaliation
cases filed in federal courts. The Court considered only a handful of retaliation
cases over the span of a decade.82 The cases the Supreme Court considered
involved large legal questions about how to interpret the underlying statute.
The Supreme Court is not a court that regularly considers the veracity of the
underlying claims. The Nassar case itself does not present a spurious claim. In
Nassar, the jury found that the employer retaliated against Dr. Nassar, and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. It is difficult to
understand how the Court would possess any particular knowledge or feel for
retaliation cases in general, let alone understand what the typical retaliation
case in a federal district court looks like.
The Supreme Court possesses no information about what claims are made
in administrative filings and how many of them are spurious. Even if it did, it is
unclear whether the Supreme Court should be the entity determining whether
there are too many spurious claims affecting the EEOC's workload. Such a
finding depends upon information the Supreme Court does not possess, such as
the workload of the EEOC. It also depends on value judgments that the agency
should be able to make for itself in line with its congressional mandate, such as
whether encouraging reporting of all potential retaliation is desirable, even if
this leads to non-cognizable complaints.
More importantly, the Court did not engage in any credible fact-finding to
interrogate the correctness of its assumption. Based on its citation, it appears
that someone simply went to the EEOC's website and found the number of
retaliation charges filed under Title VII.84 Whoever visited the website
purported to do so on June 20, 2013, after the oral argument in the case, and
just four days prior to the Court issuing its decision on June 24, 2013.
The Court did not ask the parties to brief issues related to administrability
and thus did not have the benefit of a factual record developed through the
adversarial process. It did not ask the EEOC or the government for information
about spurious claims. It did not ask the EEOC about the information available
on its web site and what the data actually reflects. It did not rely on any
Activism and Deference in the Supreme Court, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1183, 1191-92 (2013)
(discussing court deference to briefs filed by the Solicitor General). See generally Levy,
supra note 34, at 1009-10 (discussing how courts use floodgates arguments in various
contexts). We are not arguing that the Court was required to defer to the executive agency's
position regarding the underlying substantive law. However, since the Court professed
administrability concerns related to administrative agencies, it is problematic that the Court
did not look to the administrative agency for information about whether it faced a floodgate
of claims or a floodgate of spurious claims.
82. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008); G6mez-P6rez v.
Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008).
83. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524.
84. Id. at 2531.
8 5. Id.
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available empirical or other evidence to support its intuition.
The rest of this Part explores how the "evidence" the Court used in Nassar
does not support its factual claims and explores how available evidence
seriously undermines them. Finally, it questions whether the sheer volume of
claims is a valid argument.
A. No Empirically Verifiable Flood
In Nassar, the Court noted the ever-increasing number of retaliation claims
is itself problematic. 86 This Subpart explores whether the federal courts are
being inundated with retaliation cases.
The only data the Court cited in support of its argument was the increase in
the number of retaliation charges filed with the EEOC, which had nearly
doubled from 16,000 in 1997 to 31,000 in 2012. A near doubling of charges
sounds like a significant increase, but the number of charges filed with the
EEOC does not show that the court system faces floodgates of litigation. These
charge filing numbers do not provide any information about the number of
cases actually filed in court.
As described above, before a plaintiff can file a federal discrimination
lawsuit, she is required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or a
comparable state agency. One of the purposes of the EEOC administrative
process is to help individuals understand whether their claims might constitute
discrimination and to mediate claims between employers and employees. In
2012, for example, the EEOC conducted more than 11,000 mediations.89 The
number of charges filed provides little information about cases filed in court.
One key effect of the EEOC process is that the number of cases filed in court is
dramatically lower than the number of charges filed with the administrative
agencies.
The total number of civil rights employment cases filed in federal court has
declined over the past decade. The Federal Judicial Center maintains data
regarding the type and number of cases filed in U.S. district courts. In the
twelve-month period ending in March of 2003, the FJC reported more than
20,000 civil rights employment cases. 90 In the twelve-month period ending in
86. Id. at 2531-32.
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)() (2011).
89. EEOC Mediation Statistics FY 1999 through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/mediation-stats.cfmn (last
visited May 16, 2014).
90. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS--CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2003, at tbl.C-2 (2003),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/
2003/tables/CO2MarO3.pdf [hereinafter 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2003].
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March of 2012, the number of civil rights employment cases was 15,275." In
92the twelve-month period ending in March of 2013, there were 14,078. Data
from other years also shows the declining number of civil rights employment
cases filed in federal court.93 Likewise, the number of employment trials in
federal court also has declined substantially over time. 94
These declines take on added significance when compared to the total civil
case load of federal district courts, which has increased. In the twelve-month
period ending in March of 2003, the Federal Judicial Center reported 256,858
civil cases filed in federal district court. 95 In the twelve-month period ending in
March of 2012, 285,260 civil cases were commenced in federal court.96 In the
twelve-month period ending in March of 2013, there were 271,950.97
Commentators have noted the sharp drop in employment discrimination claims
since 1999.98
Instead of a floodgate of litigation, these numbers show a decline in the
number of civil rights employment cases brought in federal court. It is true that
the federal courts witnessed a large increase in the number of claims filed in
federal court between 1990 and 1997.99 But, in the last decade, the courts have
91. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2012 AND 2013, at
tbl.C-2 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2013/tables/CO2Marl3.pdf [hereinafter 12-MONTH
PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2012 AND 2013] . The FJC separately reported employment
cases under the ADA in 2012 and 2013. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Caseload Statistics Archive, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCaseloa
dStatistics Archive.aspx (last visited May 16, 2014); see also U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL
CASES COMMENCED, BY NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING
SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 THROUGH 2012, at tbl.C-2A (2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/CO2ASepl2.p
df (showing caseloads for civil rights employment cases in the 13,000-15,000 range from
2008 through 2012); U.S. DISTRICT COURTS CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY NATURE OF
SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1999 THROUGH 2003, U.S.
COURTS, at tbl.C-2A (2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2003/appendices/c2a.pdf (showing caseloads for civil rights employment
cases in the 20,000-22,000 range).
94. Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades ofFederal Civil Rights Litigation, CORNELL L.
SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, Nov. 2013, at 4, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2354386.
95. See 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31,2003, supra note 90, at tbl.C-2.
96. See 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2012 AND 2013, supra note 91, at
tbl.C-2.
97. Id.
98. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 117-18 (2009).
99. See MARIKA LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINTS IN
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 1990-98, at 4 tbl.3 (2000), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/crcusdc.pdf.
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seen fewer discrimination claims in both raw numbers and as a percentage of
their docket.
It is possible that the majority opinion was trying to make a claim directed
particularly at retaliation claims and not both retaliation and discrimination
claims. However, it cites no evidence in support of this claim. Even if there is a
chance that there is an increase in the number of retaliation claims filed in
court, these increases are part of an overall decrease in the number of federal
employment claims being filed both as a percentage of the federal docket and
in raw numbers.
The factual claim made by the majority in Nassar is even less compelling
when the argument is considered as a whole. The majority rejected a
motivating factor standard for Title VII retaliation claims and argued that if it
chose this standard, a floodgate of litigation would result. The Court ignores
that lower federal courts applied the motivating factor standard to Title VII
retaliation claims, especially after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Price
Waterhouse in 1989.100 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court interpreted
Title VII's "because of" language to allow a plaintiff to prevail by establishing
a protected trait played a motivating factor in a decision.'0 ' Moreover, after the
1991 amendments to Title VII, the EEOC issued guidance applying the
motivating factor standard to Title VII retaliation claims, which courts
followed.102 As one commentator noted, "it is clear that all circuits were, at
least at one time, willing to entertain mixed-motive Title VII retaliation
claims."' 03 Even after the Gross decision, some circuits continued to apply a
motivating factor analysis in Title VII retaliation cases.' 04
The available data provides information about how many charge and court
filings occur with the lower "motivating factor" causal standard in place in
several circuits. In some sense, the Nassar majority mischaracterizes its own
argument. In circuits that previously used the motivating factor standard, the
Court is actually arguing that its new standard will reduce the number of claims
filed below the current number, not stave off an impending flood of litigation.
100. James Concannon, Reprisal Revisited: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. and
the End of Mixed-Motive Title VII Retaliation, 17 Tx. J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 55-56 (2011)
(discussing cases).
101. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41, 250 (1989) (plurality); id. at
259 (White, J., concurring) (using a substantial factor analysis); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (using a substantial factor analysis).
102. Univ. of Tx. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8-9, Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517
(2013) (No. 12-484), 2013 WL 1462056, at *9.
103. Concannon, supra note 100, at 56-57.
104. See, e.g., Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., 665 F.3d 741, 756-57 (6th Cir. 2012)
(analyzing Title VII and § 1981 claims for retaliation using motivating-factor standard and
Price Waterhouse burden shifting); Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012);
Saridakis v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 468 Fed. Appx. 926, 931 (1lth Cir. 2012); Smith v.
Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2010).
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Additionally, making the retaliation standard higher does not necessarily
reduce the total number of cases filed in federal court. This is because some
plaintiffs file both discrimination and retaliation claims in the same complaint.
For example, a plaintiff who experienced discrimination and then faced a
negative consequence after complaining to the employer about discrimination
would be able to allege both discrimination and retaliation. Also, the Nassar
decision did not alter the Title VII discrimination causal standard, which
permits the plaintiff to establish that a protected trait was a motivating factor in
an employment decision.
Perhaps most importantly, even if there was empirical evidence to support
a potential rise in the number of retaliation claims filed in federal court, there is
no evidence that Congress wanted the courts to shift the substantive law based
on the sheer volume of such litigation.
B. The Spurious Claims' Assertion
The Nassar majority also makes a second factual claim. It argues that
choosing the motivating factor standard will lead to the filing of spurious
claims that will affect the resources of employers, administrative agencies, and
the courts. This combined fakers and floodgates argument depends on the
underlying intuition that a significant number of employees make spurious
allegations. This Part highlights the untested nature of the Justices' intuitions
and uses empirical and other data to highlight flaws in these intuitions.
The Supreme Court did not support its claim that there are enough false
discrimination claims to warrant changing the substantive law. The majority
opinion in Nassar cites no empirical or other evidence regarding the number or
likelihood of false cases or the costs to the courts, EEOC, or employers. Again,
the only data the Court invoked was the increased retaliation charge filing with
the EEOC.105 The number of EEOC charges does not provide any information
about the number offalse claims filed.
As the prior Part discusses in detail, many federal courts used the lower
causal standard for retaliation claims, and the data shows that the number of
civil rights employment cases filed in federal court declined over time.106 In
light of this data, it is difficult to make an argument that the courts will be
inundated with frivolous claims if the Court kept the standard that many courts
were already using for Title VII retaliation claims.
The Supreme Court's argument depends on the intuition that the significant
increase in Title VII retaliation charges must somehow reflect a tendency for
retaliation claims to be frivolous and that this frivolity relates to the substantive
causal standard. The Court failed to consider how its own case law clarified the
boundaries of retaliation law and how the EEOC's efforts affected charge
105. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531.
106. See supra Part ll.A.
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filing. o0 Practitioners have noted that pre-Nassar changes in retaliation law
made it more difficult for employers to obtain summary judgment on such
claims and expanded the fact scenarios that might create liability.'o They also
noted that an increased focus by the EEOC on retaliation claims might be
responsible for the increased charges.109
Available social science evidence actually shows that employees are
reluctant to believe that they have been discriminated against and are reluctant
to complain formally. For example, Professors Deborah Brake and Joanna
Grossman's work illustrates that only a small percentage of women who
experience harassment in the workplace file a formal complaint with their
employer."l0 People are reluctant to make discrimination claims because they
fear retaliation.
C. The Argument Does Not Hold
The fakers and floodgates arguments are not credible, even if one ignores
the lack of empirical or other evidence to support them. Recall what the Court
claimed. It claimed that if it chose the motivating-factor causal standard, the
courts would be inundated with claims, some of them spurious.112
Let us return to Justice Kennedy's hypothetical in Nassar about employees
who fake claims, paying specific attention to what one must believe about
spurious claims and how they affect particular entities.1 13 The hypothetical
Justice Kennedy posits is not supported by reference to any objective evidence.
Indeed, the hypothetical strains credulity.
To believe that a large number of spurious claims affect the federal courts,
you must believe that a substantial number of employees understand that they
are about to face a negative employment action. These same people must then
understand discrimination and retaliation law and be clever enough to
manufacture both a discrimination and a retaliation claim. These same
claimants must then successfully navigate the charge filing process described
above. Justice Kennedy's hypothetical also requires the reader to believe that
there are a significant number of people willing to lie to both an administrative
agency and a court.
107. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S.
271 (2009); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
108. David Long-Daniels & Peter N. Hall, Risky Business: Litigating Retaliation
Claims, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 437, 439 (2013).
109. Id. at 438-39.
110. Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859, 897-900 (2008) (summarizing social science
literature).
111. Id at 882-83, 900-05.
112. Univ. ofTx. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013).
113. Id. at 2531-32.
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To save employers from these false claims prior to any involvement by a
plaintiffs attorney, we must believe that the nefarious fakers now understand
the change in the substantive causal standard and this knowledge will deter the
faker. In other words, the nefarious faker would think, "Well, I was going to
file a false claim to my employer, but the new 'but for' standard changes my
mind."
What is more realistic is that all potential plaintiffs, whether fakers or not,
will receive the same advice from a plaintiff s lawyer: it is now difficult for the
plaintiff to win even when the person's protected activity played a role in an
employment decision. While this attorney intervention may thwart some false
claims, it will also deter legitimate claims.
In Nassar, the Court expressed a separate concern that the EEOC will
waste resources if the Court chooses a causal standard that is less onerous than
"but for" cause.l 14 However, as a factual matter, the agency that oversees the
charge filing process is in a much better position to evaluate how a floodgate of
charges affects its resources. Indeed, in Nassar, the EEOC argued in favor of
the "motivating factor" standard, and the government more generally argued in
favor of Dr. Nassar's position during the Supreme Court oral argument.' 15
Finally, there is simply no data to determine the number of frivolous
retaliation complaints made to employers. In this regard, the employer
argument is more akin to an amorphous policy argument than a factual
assertion. As discussed earlier, though, the Supreme Court's argument to favor
employers is flawed because it fails to balance the interests of retaliation
victims, which Congress explicitly required the Court to take into account in
Title Vii's text.
IV. FOUNDATIONAL FACTS COME TO VIEW
What may be most interesting about Nassar is that the majority explicitly
states its concern that some significant portion of retaliation claims could be
frivolous if courts used a motivating factor causal standard. Given this standard
was already in place in many circuit courts, the majority opinion suggests that
many frivolous cases were filed as a result of the motivating factor standard.116
In her article, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, Professor
Suzanna Sherry showed how an unstated shift in the Supreme Court's belief
about the prevalence of discrimination affected several doctrinal changes in
affirmative action law and federal employment discrimination law.117 She also
showed how an unstated belief about the number of frivolous claims could alter
114. Id. at2531.
115. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Nassar, 133
S.Ct. 2517 (No. 12-484), 2013 WL 1462056.
116. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531-32.
117. See generally Sherry, supra note 1.
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long-standing civil procedure doctrine. In Professor Sherry's account, these
foundational facts about the prevalence of discrimination and about the
likelihood of frivolous claims are not expressly stated in the relevant opinions
and must be divined from doctrinal shifts that occur over time."1 9 Nassar
contributes to Professor Sherry's account of foundational facts. In Nassar, the
Court actually professes its concern about volume and false claims in
conjunction with changing the substantive standard.120 Thus, the foundational
facts are not hidden, but rather in plain view. This Part explores what this
means for retaliation law and for discrimination law more broadly.
A. Disbelief as a Default Position
The Supreme Court has now expressed that it believes a significant number
of people who raise retaliation claims may be lying.121 While some employees
may make spurious claims, this is not a helpful position from which to begin to
understand retaliation, and to take this as a default position stunts our
understanding of the dynamics that lead to retaliation claims.
There is a rich literature showing how the default position one takes can
skew the outcome of decision making. Professor Susan Sturm has shown how
false assumptions can lead to problems in understanding how a protected trait
affects a person's success in the workplace.122 Sturm wrote an article describing
how a leading accounting firm lost significant numbers of female accountants
in the transition from junior roles to more senior roles within the
organization.123 The senior management assumed that the women were leaving
the firm to care for children at home.124 After interviewing women who left the
firm, the company discovered that the women who left were still in the
workforce.125 This then led the firm to consider ways in which its policies
might negatively affect women.126
Retaliation cases involve a complex dynamic. An employee who complains
of discrimination is making an allegation that can potentially affect the accused
discriminator's career trajectory and employment. One normal human response
to such an accusation is defensiveness and a desire to retaliate against the
complainer. Those who complain about discrimination are often viewed as
troublemakers.
118. Id. at 167-78.
119. Id. at 146-47.
120. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2531-32.
121. Id.
122. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 492-94 (2001).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 493.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 493-99.
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Both the complaining employee and the employer's agents are likely to
possess different views on why an adverse action happens after an employee
complains. To an employee who complains of discriminatory conduct and is
then subject to an adverse action, retaliation is at least one plausible
explanation for the employer's conduct. Although there might be some
employers who admit to retaliating against an employee, many employers
know that they are not supposed to engage in retaliatory conduct. They have a
legal incentive to provide a legitimate reason for taking an adverse employment
action.127 Some employers may not be aware of how a retaliatory motive
infected a decision, especially in situations involving group decision making.
Further, the employer may possess information that the employee does not
about why the employer took a particular action. And because human decision
making is often not linear, it is actually difficult to determine what motivated a
particular decision.
The facts of Nassar as recounted by the Supreme Court illustrate this
complex dynamic. Dr. Nassar is a physician of Middle Eastern descent who
was a university faculty member and a hospital physician.128 He complained
that one of his supervisors at the university discriminated against him based on
his religion and ethnic background.129 Dr. Nassar alleged the supervisor
scrutinized his billing practices and productivity and said that "Middle
Easterners are lazy."1 30
Dr. Nassar complained about the discrimination, and later received an offer
to work at the hospital, separate from his appointment at the university.131 He
resigned his teaching position and sent a letter to a university official stating
that he was quitting because of his supervisor's harassment.132 The university
official was upset because he thought the letter humiliated the supervisor.133
The university official then contacted the hospital and objected to Dr. Nassar's
job offer with the hospital. 134 The university official claimed that a contract
between the hospital and the university required open positions at the hospital
to be offered to university faculty.' 35 The hospital then rescinded Dr. Nassar's
job offer.136 A jury found that the university discriminated against Dr. Nassar
and retaliated against him for complaining about discrimination. 37
Nassar includes many of the complex dynamics involved in retaliation
127. See supra notes 68-70.
128. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2523 (2013).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2523.
131. Id. at 2523-24.
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cases. The case involves multiple supervisors making a series of employment-
related decisions over time. The case presents a common dynamic in retaliation
cases, where the employer's agents view the employee's complaint about
discrimination as a career humiliation. The case involves actions that can be
interpreted in many different ways, depending on the perspective of the
interpreter. It is unclear whether the university official would have contacted
the hospital about the contract issue absent the discrimination complaint. The
employer and its agents possess most of the information about what was
driving the decision to seek the rescission of Dr. Nassar's offer. This
complexity created numerous factual questions relating to witness credibility,
inferences that could be drawn from facts, and the weighing of evidence, which
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized as appropriate for the jury and
not a judge.' 38
The Nassar majority does not further any nuanced understanding of these
complex dynamics by advocating the view that many retaliation plaintiffs may
be lying. Further, it is likely that lower courts will try to use the "but for"
standard as a mechanism for granting summary judgment for employers and
diminishing the jury's role in untangling these complex dynamics.
B. Fact-Checking the Court
The fakers/floodgates argument is also problematic because the
significance of the argument is unclear. As stated above, it is unclear whether
the fakers/floodgates argument itself is now an official pronouncement of legal
doctrine or even dicta. It is unclear whether the claims the Court makes are now
part of a factual record about retaliation claims that can be used in future
139
cases.
This leads to several practical problems. It is unclear how the
fakers/floodgates argument can and should be used in future cases. At least one
court has already cited the Supreme Court's assertions about the "fair and
responsible allocation" of resources and concerns about "dubious" claims
within its legal description of the Title VII retaliation standard.140 Another court
has referred to the Court's concerns as a policy reason that swayed the Court's
analysis. 141
These citations, just months after the Court published its Nassar decision,
138. Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2012), vacated
and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
139. See generally Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98
VA. L. REv. 1255 (2012) (discussing the problems ofjudicial fact-finding).
140. Childs-Bey v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., No. TJS-10-2835, 2013 WL
5718747, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2013); Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, No. TJS-10-1933,
2013 WL 5487813, at *2 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2013).
141. Chase v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2013 WL 5948373, at *11 (D. Mass. 2013) (citing
concerns in context of Family and Medical Leave Act litigation).
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show that the Court has been successful in introducing new myths into
discrimination and retaliation analysis: the sheer number of claims is too high
and the number of dubious claims merits courts' attention. Given the uncertain
legal status of these arguments, however, it is unclear how to disprove them as
part of the legal process.
This Part briefly explores legal strategies for repudiating the
fakers/floodgates myth. Given the EEOC's fact-finding role in discrimination
law and the Supreme Court's co-opting of administrative concern in Nassar,
the EEOC should respond systematically to the fakers/floodgates myth.
When the EEOC is a party in a case, it can repudiate potential fakers and
floodgates claims in several ways. First, the EEOC should challenge the courts'
authority to prioritize these arguments over congressional intent. Second, it
should explicitly repudiate the fakers and floodgates claim with factual data. It
should explicitly state that the sheer number of claims is not a good reason to
limit protection. It should explicitly assert that the agency has considered the
implications of frivolous claims upon its workload and found that these
concerns do not merit favoring employers. It should assert an executive interest
in making its own factual determinations about the number of spurious claims
and should challenge the courts' ability to make these determinations as a
factual matter. In cases in which the EEOC is not a party, it should consider
filing amicus briefs making these points. At the very least, the EEOC should
make more data available through which the public can more easily understand
that discrimination claims and retaliation claims are often made in a single
charge and how many claims actually end up in court.
Additionally, employees and their attorneys should consider refuting the
fakers and floodgates claims in documents that they file with the courts. As
recent citations show, lower court judges will feel free to cite the Supreme
Court's unsupported claims about fakers and floodgates. Litigants and the
EEOC should challenge these unsupported claims. Fakers and floodgates
should not become a narrative in discrimination statutory interpretation.
C. Judicial Reasoning
In the end, what is most troubling about the fakers/floodgates claim is that
it masks "what is really at stake, who wins and who loses and why.,,142 The
Court tries to claim that administrability concerns are driving a particular
analysis when the Court lacks the evidence to support such a claim. In doing
this, the Court is making a powerful choice about which party the law should
favor. The Court's legal reasoning would be much more straightforward and
accurate if it simply stated where and why statutory ambiguities exist and also
stated that it must choose between conflicting accounts.
142. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., in TORTLAw 351, 389 (Ernest Weinrib ed., 1991).
June 2014] 245
246 STANFORD JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES [X:223
Instead of such an analysis in Nassar, the Court masks its judicial power by
claiming that various concerns forced a particular choice. The language that the
Court uses suggests that it is not making a choice, but rather that objective
characteristics of the legal system demand a particular outcome. The majority
writes: "The proper interpretation and implementation of § 2000e-3(a) and its
causation standard have central importance to the fair and responsible
allocation of resources in the judicial and litigation systems. This is of
particular significance because claims of retaliation are being made with ever-
increasing frequency."1 43
The Court is choosing to prioritize arguments about the number and
alleged frivolousness of claims. In doing so, it is choosing to ignore
congressional intent related to administrability. It also is choosing to ignore
other values and arguments. It does not consider whether the more onerous
standard will prevent retaliation or discrimination. Nor does the Court consider
whether retaliation law should recognize a cause of action when there is
credible evidence that retaliatory motive played a role in an employment
outcome.
The Justices engage in this passive construct throughout Nassar. In early
portions of the opinion, the majority claims that tort law demands a particular
result. It holds that tort law requires the plaintiff to establish "but for" cause
and that the Court assumes that Congress legislated against the backdrop of
common law torts. 144 However, neither of these propositions is universally true
in the way the Court suggests. Tort law allows courts to shift causation proof
burdens to defendants and also provides for lesser causal standards, such as
substantial factor cause.145 In any event, there is almost no evidence that
Congress intended to use tort meanings for Title VII's provisions. Title VII's
main operative provisions do not use tort words, and Title VII itself is a major
departure from the common law rule of at-will employment.146
Once the reader understands that tort law and concerns about fakers and
floodgates do not demand a particular outcome, it is easier to see the choices
143. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013).
144. Id. at 2524-25.
145. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980) (discussing ways
that plaintiff could recover despite being unable to establish which defendant caused
plaintiffs harm); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1948); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 27 (2010) (noting that a different factual cause standard exists when multiple
sufficient causes exist); id. at § 27 reporter's note (stating that there is nearly universal
recognition that the "but for" standard is inappropriate when multiple sufficient causes
exist); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 cmt. d (1965) (noting there can be more than
one source of harm); id § 432 (noting that plaintiff can still establish factual cause when
more than one actor causes harm); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 9 cmt. b (1934)
(defining a legal cause as one that is a "substantial factor in bringing about the harm").
146. See Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014);
Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law and Proximate Cause, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
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the Court makes. We do not challenge the ability of the Court to make choices
about statutory construction, but rather believe that the Court could state its
arguments more clearly.
A much more interesting and helpful Nassar analysis could have proceeded
along the following substantive lines. First, it would recognize how the Court's
prior decisions and the 1991 amendments to Title VII created a complex and
potentially ambiguous legal backdrop for resolving the problem. Second, the
Court would admit that the first two decades of Title VII jurisprudence did not
rely on tort law. Third, the Court would recognize that Title VII is designed to
provide a remedy for retaliation victims, but that this aim might be in tension
with other values that the Court believes should be considered in interpreting
the statute. Finally, the Court would state that three possible interpretations of
the Title VII retaliation provision are textually supportable.
The Court should state that it is making the choice regarding the direction
of Title VII's retaliation provision and not contend that the choice is foisted
upon it by external, objective concerns. This analysis describes the dispute
more concretely, does not add extraneous elements, and provides a clearer
account about the Court's statutory construction decisions.
V. THE BROADER PROBLEM OF COURTS' INTERFERENCE
WITH CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
The fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 marks an important
milestone and an opportunity to reflect on how courts approach claims under
the statute. The skepticism articulated by the Supreme Court through its
discussion about fakers and floodgates is indicative of a broader problem of
how courts have treated civil rights claims. Judicial skepticism is now
imbedded within the fabric of civil rights litigation through both substantive
and procedural barriers. These barriers allow courts to dismiss cases before
they go to a jury. When cases do go before a jury, a number of mechanisms
allow courts to second guess the jury's verdict. For example, a court may grant
a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, may grant remittitur, or may
decrease the punitive damages award using a court-created proportionality
analysis.
These limits are important because they are added to a series of barriers
already placed within Title VII by Congress. As discussed earlier,147 Congress
requires Title VII plaintiffs to first submit their claims to a federal or state
agency within a short limitations period. The plaintiff must then file her
complaint within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter. The plaintiff
must be the kind of person protected by the statute and must work for an
employer large enough to face liability under Title VII. If the plaintiff prevails
on a Title VII claim, her available relief is limited by the statute's definition of
147. See supra Part II.
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damages and the cap on combined compensatory and punitive damages.
Congress has not increased this damages cap since 1991.
The courts have added even more substantive barriers to the ones explicitly
provided in Title VII. While the Supreme Court has recognized a sexual
harassment cause of action, the courts interpret the statute to require plaintiffs
to establish a certain threshold of conduct before an employer will face
liability.'48 This court-created interpretation allows courts to dismiss
harassment claims for not meeting the required legal threshold, even when a
jury might conclude that the plaintiff was harassed based on a protected trait.
Courts have declared that the following conduct does not constitute harassment
as a matter of law: kissing, slapping on the behind with a newspaper, brushing
up against a plaintiffs breast and behind, rubbing the plaintiffs arm from
shoulder to wrist, or attempting to touch the plaintiff on numerous occasionS.149
Moreover, the Supreme Court created an agency doctrine for Title VII that
allows employers to escape liability even if a plaintiff is able to establish she
suffered harassment in the workplace. If the employer takes no tangible
employment action against an employee, the employer can escape liability for
harassment if it establishes a court-created affirmative defense.150
The courts have also created a stray remarks doctrine that allows courts
considering summary judgment and other procedural motions to exclude
certain discriminatory remarks and conduct from the evidence the court
considers."' Courts often separate evidence in ways that allow them to dismiss
plaintiffs claims without considering the totality of allegations.' 52
Additionally, plaintiffs who try to establish discrimination by showing they
were treated differently than others outside their protected class are often
required to prove a higher level of similarity than is actually necessary to
establish a possible inference of discrimination.' 53 Some courts also infer that if
a decision maker makes a positive employment decision about a plaintiff then it
is unlikely that the person is motivated by a protected trait in making a
subsequent negative decision.
These substantive barriers are then combined with procedural mechanisms
148. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 72 (1986) (requiring the conduct to
be severe or pervasive).
149. See, e.g., Hockman v. Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 328 (5th Cir.
2004); Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 872, 874-75 (5th Cir.
1999); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993).
150. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
151. See generally Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray
Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. REV. 149 (2012).
152. Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REv. 69, 86
(2011).
153. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 743-51
(2001).
154. Nancy Gertner, Losers' Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 122-23 (2012),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/losers-rules.
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that bar or negatively affect claims. The possible convergence of the motions to
dismiss and summary judgment under Twombly and Iqbal make employment
discrimination claims even more vulnerable at a time in the litigation when
there has been no opportunity for discovery.15' The Supreme Court also
heightened the requirements for class certification under Rule 23 in an
employment discrimination case. 156 Moreover, several studies show that courts
dismiss civil rights claims more often than other types of claims, often by
summary judgment. 157 Upon a motion for summary judgment or to dismiss, it
also appears that judges infuse their own views of the evidence.'58 On appeal,
in employment discrimination cases, "courts reverse plaintiffs' wins below far
more often than defendants' wins below."1 59 Former judge Nancy Gertner has
stated that this trend is not accidental. In judge training, judges have been
instructed on how to "get rid" of civil rights cases.160
In the few cases when juries hear civil rights claims, courts often second-
guess these types of claims more often than other types of claims. For example,
judges remit damages found by juries in such cases comparatively more.161 The
treatment of the courts of these cases is even more remarkable because these
cases are some of the most factually intensive in the courts, making them the
least appropriate for judges to decide.
CONCLUSION
It is not new that judges' intuitions affect the substantive outcome of cases.
But Nassar's claims and outcome go beyond mere judicial intuition. The
majority opinion makes unsupported factual claims about retaliation cases,
claims that may become part of the running, default narrative about retaliation
cases.
This Article has demonstrated three important facts about fakers and
floodgates. First, the Supreme Court has cited no support for its factual
assertions. Indeed, available evidence seriously undercuts them. Second, the
federal courts possess powerful tools for handling these concerns without
155. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010).
156. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (holding that
"commonality" requirement for class certification obligates named plaintiff to show that
class members have suffered "the same injury").
157. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 517, 520-21 (2010).
158. Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy ofDispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 759
(2009).
159. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 98, at 111.
160. Gertner, supra note 154, at 117.
161. See Suja A. Thomas, Re-examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731,745-46 (2003).
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altering the substantive law. Third, through the fakers and floodgates claims,
the Supreme Court is prioritizing its own intuitions about administrability over
the intent of Congress as expressed in Title VII's text.
